


























































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































correct performances）」（LA, p.113）であり、言い換えれば、「楽譜と一致した（in accordance 














































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































Bel, Clive. 1958. Art, Capricon Books: New York
Currie, Gregory. 2004. Arts and Minds, Oxford University Press.
Danto,Arthur. 1981. The Transfigurations of the Commonplace, Harvard University Press.
Goodman, Nelson. 1976. Languages of Art, 2nd ed., Hackett. [LAと略記]
――. 1978. Ways of Worldmaking, Hackett. [WWと略記] （菅野盾樹・中村雅之訳『世界制作
の方法』みすず書房、1987年）
――. 1984. Of Mind and Other Matters, Harvard University Press. [MMと略記]
Goodman,Nelson and Elgin, Catherine Z. 1988. Reconceptions in Philosophy and Other Arts 
and Sciences, Routledge.[RPと略記]（菅野盾樹訳『記号作用』みすず書房、2001年）
Janaway, Christopher. 1992. “Borges and Danto: A Reply to Wreen”, British Journal of 
Aesthetics 32, 72-76.
――. 1999. “What a Musical Forgery Isn’t”, British Journal of Aesthetics 39, 62-71.
Lamarque, Peter. 2010. Work and Object, Oxford University Press.
Levinson, Jerrold. 1990. Music, Art, and Metaphysics, Cornel University Press.
Morton Luis H. and Foster, Thomas R. 1991 “Goodman, Forgery, and the Aesthetic”, in The 
Journal of Aesthetics and Art Criticism 49, pp.155-159.










This paper examines the arguments concerning artistic forgery which Nelson 
Goodman presented in chapter 3 of his Languages of Art (2nd ed.,1976).
His arguments are divided into two parts. The first part(sections 1-2) seeks to elucidate 
the reason why there is any aesthetic diference between a deceptive forgery and an 
original artwork even when there are no perceptible diference between the two. Goodman 
first points out that the information of the diference of history between the two pictures 
implies the possibility of their perceptual discrimination in the future. The implication of 
this possibility, he argues, changes the way we look at the pictures, though we cannot 
perceive their diference now. And Goodman claims that ‘the aesthetic properties of a 
picture include not only those found by looking at it but also those that determine how it is 
to be looked at.’ Therefore the information of the diference of history of the two pictures 
constitutes aesthetic diference between them. 
These views of Goodman have often been regarded as resulting in a version of 
aesthetic phenomenalism (or formalism) but I argue that such an interpretation is not 
correct. I also point out that there is an important diference between Goodman’s theory 
and the aesthetic historicism like Danto.
The second part(sections3-4) introduces a classification of artworks into the 
‘autographic’ and the ‘alographic’ and investigates its ontological ground. The 
classification has been regarded to be problematic by many scholars, because it is regarded 
to be problematic whether there are alographic artworks at al. The focus of discussion has 
been the cases where there is only one text which, however, could be counted as two works 
when related to diferent authors and diferent acts of creation. Goodman tried to explain 
these cases as instances of textual ambiguity, but my estimation is that his explanation fails. 
Works of literature (and music) must be distinguished from their texts (or pure sound 
structures) and their ontological diference cannot be explained merely as a result from 
semantic ambiguity. I also argue, however, that, focusing the consideration at the level of 
tokens, the ontological character of the printed or written tokens of works of literature and 
music are fundamentaly diferent from the tokens of autographic works like prints and cast 
sculptures. Works of literature and music cannot be forged by making copies of their 
printed or written tokens. In this respect at least, Goodman’s concept of alographic art 
applies to literature and music. 
Nelson Goodman on Artistic Forgery :
A Critical Commentary on Languages of Art, Chap.3
